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Abstract 
Reports suggest up to 5000 European Union citizens have joined jihadist militant groups 
located in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen.  Approximately one in 15 of those returning to their 
Member State of origin are suspected of involvement in terrorist activities.  This serious 
threat challenging European Unions internal borders is unprecedented, observed following 
the terrorist attacks in Paris and Copenhagen in 2015, and an earlier attack in 2014 
perpetrated by an Islamic State operative.   
In response, to ensure the safety of their citizens and protect national security some Member 
States of the European Union have introduced legal measures at port and border controls.  
Germany is planning new anti-terror legislation aimed at confiscating citizens’ identification 
cards, for a period of three years, and the UK passed legislation allowing for the seizure of 
passports and travel documents of those suspected of being involved in terrorist activity.  
Further provision has been created or proposed, introducing temporary exclusion orders 
lasting for at least two years.   
In light of the differing laws and measures between the Member States, the European Union 
must introduce legislation to harmonise anti-terror laws throughout the 28 Member States 
with regards to port and border controls, safeguarding a balance between individual 
fundamental human rights protected under the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, whilst maintaining public safety and national security. 
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Introduction 
Recent reports suggest that approximately 5000 European Union citizens have been, and are 
currently engaged in terrorist related activities in conflict zones such as Syria, Iraq, Libya and 
Yemen.  One in 15 returning suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, potentially pose 
a threat to their respective Member State upon return.1  The immeasurable nature and vast 
numbers serves to fashion an extraordinarily difficult if not impossible task of monitoring 
suspects and accurately managing the risk.  In addition to the independent operational ability 
of potential terrorists, this fact has led Rob Wainwright head of Europol to assert that the 
European Union currently faces the highest terror threat since the US attack by Al-Qaeda in 
2001.2   
In the absence of European Union legislation some Member States have proactively shaped 
their own legal measures to reduce the threat posed from returning citizens.  The UK for 
example enacted the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, introducing measures that 
allow authorities to seize passports and travel documents, and further allow the Secretary of 
State to temporary exclude citizens suspected of involvement in terrorist related activity 
returning to the UK. 3   Germany and France are currently discussing similar yet more 
intrusive longer-term temporary measures.4   
This paper will show that Member States actions in response to the current terror threat are 
not conducive with the aims of the European Union, particularly in terms of conformity and 
                                                          
1 G. Buttarelli, (2015). ‘Counter-terrorism, De-Radicalisation and Foreign Fighters’, Joint debate during the 
extraordinary meeting of the LIBE Committee’. European Parliament, Brussels, 27 January 2015 
2 V. Dodd, (2015). ‘Europe faces highest terror threat since 9/11, MPs told’, The Guardian, 13 January 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/13/europe-highest-terror-threat-911-europol-fighting-
overseas accessed 30 April 2015 
3 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s1, 2, 3, 4. 
4 D. Tost, (2015) ‘Germany set to pass one of the harshest anti-terror laws in Europe’, EU News and policy 
debates, across languages, 5 February 2015 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/germany-
set-pass-one-harshest-anti-terror-laws-europe-311851 accessed 30 April 2015 
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consistency, and the impact these measures pose to citizens’ human rights protected under the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Charter).5 
It will be argued the European Union should enact specifically detailed and phrased 
legislation, somewhat in line with the UK’s recent legislative measures. 6   These are 
representative of a far less intrusive nature than that proposed by other Member States.  This 
would serve to introduce safeguards and protect Charter rights.  What cannot be denied is that 
the current international terror threat requires an international cohesive response.7 
The Threat 
The current and potential threat to the internal borders of the European Union (EU) has never 
been so serious, and can be disseminated into two segments.8  Firstly, the self-radicalisation 
of EU citizens represents one of the most fear-provoking realities, brought about by terrorist 
groups grooming use of the Internet and social media, influencing them to leave their host 
Member State to receive terrorist training and to fight with the group.  This is worrying given 
that such citizens can stay under the State security agencies radar, hence remaining relatively 
unknown until they have either left the Member State, or a family member or friend notifies 
the authorities.9  Secondly, EU citizens that have successfully left their country to receive 
terrorist training and fight with terrorist groups after being radicalised, or indeed as part of 
their radicalisation process.  The training provides citizens with independent operational 
                                                          
5 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT accessed 1 June 2015 
6 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
7 J. Bamat, (2015). ‘French PM unveils package of anti-terror measures’, see: 
http://www.france24.com/en/20150121-france-pm-manuel-valls-unveils-new-anti-terror-measures accessed 
1 June 2015 
8 J. Argomaniz, O. Bures, and C. Kaunert, (2014). ‘A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical 
Assessment’, Intelligence and National Security, 30:2-3, 191-206, 203. See also: V. Dodd, (2015). ‘Europe faces 
highest terror threat since 9/11, MPs told’, The Guardian, 13 January 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2015/jan/13/europe-highest-terror-threat-911-europol-fighting-overseas accessed 30 April 2015 
9 T. Burrows, (2015). ‘Families of three London schoolgirls believed to have gone to Syria to become 'jihadi 
brides' travel to Turkey to retrace their steps’, The Daily Mail Online, 23 March 2015, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3008382/Families-three-London-schoolgirls-believed-gone-Syria-
jihadi-brides-travel-Turkey-retrace-steps.html accessed 1 June 2015 
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abilities and enhanced skills in using firearms and explosives, evidenced by the terrorists’ 
actions seen in the Paris and Copenhagen attacks in 2015, and in Belgium 2014.10  This 
second element poses the greatest risk given that one in 15 of those who have received such 
training, who then return potentially pose a direct terrorist threat to their host Member 
States.11  The potential risk to the EU as a whole is dramatically intensified due to the 
freedom of movement of EU citizens, particularly within the Schengen area.12  Considering 
both elements of the fold, the immeasurable nature of the current threat is most concerning in 
terms of the Member States duty in protecting its citizens and national security.   
The main international terrorist groups actively radicalising and pro-offering training to EU 
citizens are the Islamic State (IS or ISIS or ISIL), Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, the Al-Nusra 
Front, Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram.13  In addition to the grooming use of social media and in 
the course of conducting a huge online marketing campaign they infiltrate EU citizens’ 
                                                          
10 V. Dodd, (2015). ‘Europe faces highest terror threat since 9/11, MPs told’, The Guardian, 13 January 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/jan/13/europe-highest-terror-threat-911-europol-fighting-
overseas accessed 1 June 2015.  For Paris terrorist attacks see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-
30708237 accessed 30 April 2015. For Copenhagen terrorism attack see: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/14/copenhagen-blasphemy-lars-vilks-prophet-muhammad-
krudttonden-cafe accessed 1 June 2015. For Belgium terrorist attack please see: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/24/brussels-jewish-museum-attack-three-dead accessed 1 
June 2015 
11 G. Buttarelli, (2015). ‘Counter-terrorism, De-Radicalisation and Foreign Fighters’, Joint debate during the 
extraordinary meeting of the LIBE Committee’. European Parliament, Brussels, 27 January 2015 
12 ‘The free movement of persons is a fundamental right guaranteed by the EU to its citizens. It entitles every 
EU citizen to travel, work and live in any EU country without special formalities. Schengen cooperation 
enhances this freedom by enabling citizens to cross-internal borders without being subjected to border checks. 
The border-free Schengen Area guarantees free movement to more than 400 million EU citizens, as well as to 
many non-EU nationals, businessmen, tourists or other persons legally present on the EU territory.’ See 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/index_en.htm 
accessed 1 June 2015.  And see also: ‘Free movement of workers is a fundamental principle of the Treaty 
enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and developed by EU 
secondary legislation and the Case law of the Court of Justice.’ http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=457 
accessed 1 June 2015. 
13 For the Islamic State please see: M. Chulov, (2014). ‘Isis: the inside story’, The Guardian, 11 December 2014, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story accessed 1 June 2015.  For Al-
Qaeda see: A. Wander, (2008).  ‘A history of terror: Al-Qaeda 1988-2008’, The Guardian, 13 July 2008, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jul/13/history.alqaida accessed 1 June 2015.  For Al-Nusra Front 
see: H. Mustapha, (2014). ‘The al-Nusra Front: From Formation to Dissension’, Policy Analysis, Arab Centre for 
Research and Policy Studies, available online at http://english.dohainstitute.org/file/get/9dd86818-7314-40ec-
bf8e-be4a0db226c0.pdf accessed 1 June 2015. Al-Shabaab see: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
15336689 accessed 1 June 2015. For Boko Haram see: F. Chothia, (2015). ‘Who are Nigeria's Boko Haram 
Islamists? BBC Africa, 4 May 2015 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501 accessed 1 June 2015. 
5 
 
homes and target children and vulnerable adults, radicalising them to their perverted 
interpretation of religious, and political, idealistic values.   
In light of the threat posed, the Member Sates have been left to introduce legal measures to 
deal with both segments to the threat, to stem the flow of EU citizens leaving their country to 
engage in terrorist activity, and then to halt their return until an assessment can be made as to 
their potential threat level.  It is at this point the EU should take the lead and set the minimum 
standards for implementing pre-terrorism sanctions, particularly for those Member States yet 
to deal effectively with this issue, and to safeguard fundamental rights. 
Pre-Terrorism Sanctions 
A growing tendency in preventing an act of terrorism and combating the threat has been the 
sanctioning of terrorism before an act has been carried out.  Preparatory acts of terrorism, 
such as the collection of data have been sanctioned in the UK for example since the 
introduction of the Terrorism Act 2000.14  Some Member States, however, have implemented 
precautionary risk management logic providing forward momentum from mere prevention to 
pre-emption, by way of quasi-criminal measures.15  These pre-terrorism measures are brought 
about by legislation, introducing either judicial or special executive prohibition orders.16  
They are utilised when the State lacks adequate evidence to arrest and bring formal criminal 
charges against a suspect, yet have reasonable suspicion they are, or/and have been engaged 
in terrorism related activity.  The nature and practical implications of restricting movement of 
                                                          
14 Terrorism Act 2000, s57: ‘Possession for terrorist purposes, (1) A person commits an offence if he possesses 
an article in circumstances which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that his possession is for a purpose 
connected with the commission, preparation or instigation of an act of terrorism: and s58: Collection of 
information, (1) A person commits an offence if (a) he collects or makes a record of information of a kind likely 
to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism, or (b) he possesses a document or record 
containing information of that kind.’ 
15 M. D. Boer, and I. Wiegand, (2015). ‘From Convergence to Deep Integration: Evaluating the Impact of EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategies on Domestic Arenas’. Intelligence and National Security, 30:2-3, 377-401, 401 
16 M. D. Boer, and I. Wiegand, (2015). ‘From Convergence to Deep Integration: Evaluating the Impact of EU 
Counter-Terrorism Strategies on Domestic Arenas’. Intelligence and National Security, 30:2-3, 377-401, 401 
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suspects in the absence of formal criminal charges or prosecution, impact heavily upon 
Charter rights.17  Whilst the EU’s and Member States legal and policy developments in this 
area have been driven by concerns of security and public safety, the majority of scholars have 
suggested that as a result human rights have been adversely affected.18  This may be the case, 
however, it is argued that without the adequate safeguarding of citizens Article 2 right 
protected under the Charter, (Right to life), the others such as Articles 6, 7 and 8 are rather 
redundant.19   
The EU has not been entirely opposed to implementing such restrictive measures.  This as 
seen in the directive preventing the use of the financial system, for the purposes of money 
laundering and terrorist financing.20  Some individual Member States have a rather long 
history of dealing with other forms of terrorism whereby quasi-criminal measures have been 
necessitated.  The UK for example has restricted the movement of terrorist suspects since 
implementing the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMA).  
Using the UK as a case study, their introductions was led by the UK’s eventual failure to 
legitimately and legally deport foreign nationals who posed a potential terror threat and 
secondly, to provide legal authority to legitimately subject UK nationals to viscous intensities 
                                                          
17 Such as Article 6 Right to liberty and security and Article 7 Respect for private and family life, The Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
18 C. Kaunert, J. D. Occhipinti, and S. Leonard, (2014). ‘Introduction: supranational governance in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice after the Stockholm Programme’. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 
27:1, 39-47: 39-40.  See also: A. Baldaccini, E. Guild and H Guiuld (eds) (2007). ‘Whose freedom, security and 
justice? EC Immigration and asylum law and policy’. (Oxford: Hart) And: T. Balzacq and S. Carrera (eds) (2006). 
‘Security versus freedom? A challenge for Europe’s Future’. (Aldershot: UK: Ashgate). And: D. Bigo, S. Carrera, E. 
Guild and R. Walker (eds) (2010). ‘Europe’s 21st Century challenge: delivering liberty.’ (Farnham, UK: Ashgate). 
And: E. Guild and F. Geyer (eds) (2008). ‘Security versus justice? Police and judicial cooperation in the European 
Union.’ (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate). And: J. Huysmans (2006). ‘The politics of insecurity: fear, migration and 
asylum in the European Union.’ (London: Routledge). And: J. Monar, W. Rees and V. Mitsilegas (2003), ‘The 
European Union and internal security: guardian of the people?’ (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave). And: R. Van 
Munster (2009). ‘Securitizing immigration: the politics of the risk in the EU.’ (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan).  
19 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT.  
20 Directive on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and 
terrorist financing (2005/60/EC) 
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of surveillance in order to reduce the level of a continuing threat.21  More intrusive genres of 
quasi-criminal measures have historically existed and been used by the UK, such as the 
power of internment issued under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern 
Ireland) 1922 (more commonly known simply as the Special Powers Act).  Introduced to deal 
primarily with the geo-political terrorist threat, the increase in suspected Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) membership in the 1970’s led to a surge in the use of these wide sweeping 
powers. 22   Paragraph 23 of the Schedule allowed for the indefinite internment without 
warrant or trial of, 
 ‘…any person whose behaviour is of such a nature as to give reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that he has acted or is acting or is about to act in a manner prejudicial to the 
preservation of the peace or maintenance of order’.23 
The importance of this historical context cannot be overlooked due to the current system of 
TPIMs being referred to as merely a form of internment with different packaging. 24  
Although such an assertion lends itself to a good headline, the legal framework and 
conditional requirements are entirely different.  The legal genealogy of the TPIMA can be 
traced specifically to Part IV of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA) 
that permitted the Home Secretary to detain foreign nationals indefinitely, suspected of 
international terrorist activity.25  Although not entirely linked, this particular statute was put 
before UK Parliament and enacted following Al Qaeda’s terrorist attack on the US, on 11th 
September 2001.26  These measures have since been retracted and the expanded in a game of 
                                                          
21 Chahal v United Kingdom [1996] 23 EHRR 413. See also: K. D. Ewing, ‘Bonfire of the Liberties: New Labour, 
Human Rights, and the Rule of Law’ (Oxford University Press 2010) 227 
22 D. McKittrick and D. McVea, (2001). ‘Making Sense of the Troubles’(Penguin Books) 11 
23 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/hmso/spa1922.htm accessed 1 June 2015 
24 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/18/ira-marian-price-internment accessed 1 June 
2015 
25 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 s23; provided that a suspected international terrorist could be 
indefinitely detained under immigration powers should expulsion from UK fail by way of ECHR obligations.  
Detainee could appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. 
26 C. Walker, (2009). ‘Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation’ (2nd edition Oxford: Oxford 
University Press) 25 
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phrased chess, played out between the UK judiciary and the executive.  They remain 
expanded since 2015 in an attempt to halt both segments of the current terror threat. 
Forbidding Free Movement: outbound 
Remaining for the moment within the ambit of UK legislation, on the 12th February 2015 the 
UK coalition government passed the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA).  This 
Act was introduced to deal with citizens leaving the UK to engage in terrorist related activity, 
and to implement measures to halt those who wish to return to the UK after training and 
fighting with terrorist groups.  Part 1 Chapter 1 of the CTSA has introduced more quasi-
criminal measures, allowing policing agencies to seize passports and travel documents from 
persons suspected of involvement in terrorism: 
 (1) Schedule 1 makes provision for the seizure and temporary retention of travel 
       documents where a person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or 
       the United Kingdom in connection with terrorism-related activity. 
 
Under Schedule One the citizen’s passport can be retained for up to 14 days from the day 
after the initial seizure.27  This time allowance can be extend to 30 days from the day after the 
initial seizure, should the judiciary agree that the relevant persons have been acting diligently 
and expeditiously in relation to the matters.28  These provision were debated heavily during 
the enactment stages that led Lord Carlile to state: 
“…We heard some criticism of Clause 1, but I say…[Lordships] have got to get real 
about what Clause 1 is dealing with. Let me give you [a hypothetical] 
example…Suppose a suspicious travel agent who is public spirited telephones the police 
and says, ‘I have just sold an air ticket in suspicious circumstances’, and the authorities 
decide it is worth following the person who has bought the air ticket. That kind of 
incident can occur within an hour, and it does not leave the time to go off to a judge to 
get permission to seize that passport. We have to allow the authorities to deal with the 
urgent provisions made in Clause 1 and Schedule 1”.29 
Following this example the urgency and requirement for such emergency power can be 
appreciated.  Whilst the time limitations are not too restrictive, this clearly impacts upon 
                                                          
27 See paragraph 5(2) and (3)(a) of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
28 See paragraph 8(4), (5), (6) and (7) of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015 
29 Lord Carlile of Berriew, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords Second Reading Stage, (13 
January 2015: Column 722 7.27pm) 
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Article 45 of the Charter, Freedom of movement and of residence.  Similar to that of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, any limitation on the exercise of the rights and 
freedoms under the Charter must be provided for by law.30  Proportionality is the ultimate test 
of course and it must be deemed necessary in meeting recognised Union objectives, or to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others.31  The test for any State is their ability to keep its 
citizens safe.  Therefore, expanding this requirement to the EU, the latter seems more 
appropriate in terms of preventing a citizen from leaving the Member State to engage in 
terrorist related activity.  Ultimately it also protects the vulnerable adults and children from 
themselves, and from being further radicalised and introduced to terrorist related activity 
should they be permitted to leave.   
Germany, in response to current estimates that 550 individuals have travelled to Syria and 
Iraq to join organisations such as IS, and the fact at least 180 have returned, has approved 
draft legislation aimed at preventing travel for individuals involved in terrorist activities, by 
means of confiscating citizens’ personal identification cards (ID).  The measures under 
consideration are much more intrusive than that of the UK, allowing for ID to be withdrawn 
for up to three years, pushing the boundaries one might say of the phrase ‘temporary’.32  
German Justice Minister Heiko Maas recognises this fact stating:  
‘…we will have one of the harshest criminal anti-terrorism laws in all of Europe…that 
will make Germany safer.’33   
France has proposed a bill allowing powers similar to that of the UK.  The Interior Minister 
under Article 1 could prevent citizens from leaving France if there were serious reasons to 
believe such citizens were leaving with the aim of participating in terrorist activities.  Should 
                                                          
30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 52(1) 
31 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 52(1) 
32 D. Tost, (2015). ‘Germany discusses new law to crack down on foreign fighters’ EurActiv.com, 15 January 
2015 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/new-german-law-intended-crack-down-foreign-
fighters-311283 accessed 20 May 2015 
33 D. Tost, (2015). ‘Germany set to pass ‘one of the harshest’ anti-terror laws in Europe’, EurActiv.com, 5 
February 2015 http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/germany-set-pass-one-harshest-anti-
terror-laws-europe-311851 accessed 20 May 2015 
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the executive suspect the citizen to be traveling to where terrorist groups operate thereby in 
environments conducive to their posing a threat to public safety upon their return to France, 
the passport could be withdrawn and prevented from leaving.34  Although the aims of the 
Member States are the same, the words and phrases making up the ingredients used differ 
tremendously.   
Forbidding Free Movement: the return 
‘Then, England’s ground, farewell; sweet soil, adieu…Where’er I wander, boast of this I can, 
Though banish’d, yet a trueborn Englishman’.35  The expression ‘temporary exclusion orders’ 
raises contemplations of banishment, indicative of Shakespeare’s Richard II whereby two 
members of Richard’s court were exiled.  The UK, by way of Part 1 Chapter 2 of the CTSA 
fashions further intrusive measures termed ‘temporary exclusion orders’ and orates, 
(1) A temporary exclusion order is an order which requires an individual not to return to 
the United Kingdom unless- 
  (a) the return is in accordance with a permit to return issued by the Secretary of 
       State before the individual began the return, or 
  (b) the return is the result of the individual’s deportation to the UK. 
 
Five conditions must be met before an order by the Secretary of State can be made and the 
order lasts up to two years.36  Importantly, they require the Secretary of State to reasonably 
suspect that the individual is, or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity outside the 
UK, and reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting 
members of the public in the UK from a risk of terrorism, for a temporary exclusion order to 
be imposed on the individual.37   Either the UK Court can grant the Secretary of State 
permission to make an order under section 3, or the Secretary of State can show he considers 
                                                          
34 Human Rights Watch, (2014). ‘France: counterterrorism bill threatens human rights’, 10 October 2014 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/09/france-counterterrorism-bill-threatens-rights accessed 20 May 2015 
35 W. Shakespeare, The Complete Works of William Shakespeare, ‘The Life and Death of King Richard II’. Act I, 
Scene III, as per Boling. (Odhams Press Limited: London) 435.  See also: Baroness Hamwee, Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords Second Reading Stage, (13 January 2015: Column 667 and 668) 
36 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, 4(3)(b) limits the temporary exclusion orders to 2 years inclusive 
37 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Chapter 2 
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the urgency of the case requires a temporary exclusion order to be imposed without obtaining 
permission.38  The UK democratic issues are beyond the ambit of this paper, needless to say 
the Act provides exceptionally wide powers to the executive.  The two-year clause was 
debated heavily during the enactment stages, leading Lord Carlile to state:  
‘…I do not understand the two-year period contained in these amendments. The issue 
which we are dealing with and which is covered in this clause is, unfortunately, going to 
last for more than two years…having a two-year sunset clause…would send out a 
completely incorrect message to those who are minded to go abroad and participate in 
jihad…We have to show some enduring determination over this issue.’39 
Although the Charter rights under Union law appear to have lacked discussion, the Marquess 
of Lothian raised a valid concern: 
‘…looking at the time factor here, what is the legal and international status of someone 
who has been subjected to a temporary exclusion order?’40 
 
In fact, Article 19 of the Charter prohibits collective expulsion, or the expulsion of a person 
to a State where there is a risk of torture, the death penalty or other inhuman, degrading 
treatment.  Although limited by law, it is argued this particular aspect of the Members States 
legislative measure will increasingly come under judicial scrutiny.  The Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU) is not disinclined in striking down measures that are 
disproportionate in nature, particularly when such citizens could be permitted to return to the 
Member State and subjected to other forms of pre-terrorism sanctions, in accordance with 
other existing legislative measures.41  Lord Macdonald of River Glaven appears to have at 
least recognised the impact of these measures and the potential for such friction between the 
executive and the courts: 
                                                          
38 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Chapter 2(7)(b) 
39 Lord Carlile of Berriew, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords First Committee Stage, (20 
January 2015: Column 1212) 
40 Marquess of Lothian, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords First Committee Stage, (20 
January 2015: Column 1213) 
41 In the UK for example please see, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, s2, and the 
extension to these measures brought about by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, s16 
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‘…we should not give away our freedoms in response to terrorism…[it] would be a good 
idea if  [we] were to include a sunset clause…[because the] practicalities of this 
measure—how it will work in practice—…are most in doubt. Those practicalities will 
significantly impact on the rights of people on whom the orders are imposed…I support 
the idea of a sunset clause so that the House can thoroughly review how the legislation is 
working in practice.’42 
Mere suspicion that a citizen has engaged with terrorist activity is the required threshold.  
Considering the length of time the temporary exclusion order may be in place and the 
intrusive nature of these orders, the threshold should be raised and the executive be satisfied 
the citizen would pose a serious threat upon return.   
Although measures of this kind may seem over intrusive the fact that the immeasurable 
number of EU citizens estimated to be involvement with terrorist related activity should not 
be overlooked.  Remarkably, the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation reported 
that Belgium is ranked third in terms of estimated numbers of citizens per capita leaving to 
fight in Syria, with France and the UK being first and second.43  With approximately 300 
Belgian citizens currently fighting, Foreign Minister Didier Reynders confirmed that 
‘returned fighters are subject to investigation and monitoring’.44  Although similar in nature, 
the blatant polarised differences between the Member States legislative measures, in 
particular the immensely intrusive nature of Germanys proposals shows the EU must step in 
to protect fundamental rights and freedoms under the Charter.  The EU should work to 
protect young and vulnerable adults who have been radicalised and prevent them leaving the 
EU to take part in terrorist related activity by enacting legislation to harmonise the law that 
temporarily prohibits EU citizens from returning to the designated Member State. 
EU Internal Security Governance 
                                                          
42 Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords First Committee 
Stage, (20 January 2015: Column 1214) 
43 For further information please see: http://icsr.info  
44 EurActiv.com, (2015). ‘In Belgium and France, marginalised Muslims fight in Syria ‘out of despair’’, 16 
January 2015, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/justice-home-affairs/belgium-and-france-marginalised-
muslims-fight-syria-out-despair-311338 accessed 20 May 2015 
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From the historical and traditional perspective, the provision of security to citizens has been 
provided exclusively by the Member States of the European Union. 45   Domestic 
constitutional links between providing internal security and protecting national sovereignty 
with regards to EU action, remains guarded by individual Member States, as in Article 5 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 117 of the Constitution of the Italian 
Republic.46  These examples provide specific domestic provisions highlighting the ultimate 
responsibility of State internal security, lies with the individual Member States.47  However, 
given the nature of the current international terror threat, EU security governance must 
become an increasingly accepted concept.  Due to the intrinsic nature of the EU Member 
States relationships, coupled with those in particular who are a part of the Schengen 
agreement, a united EU international response is required.   
The Treaty on the European Union (TEU) specifies that one of the crucial aims of the Union 
is to deliver citizens a high level of safety within an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(AFSJ).48  This formal mandate providing the EU with the necessary authority exists by way 
of Article 3(2) TEU and Article 67(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).  The law surrounding this area is however, somewhat contradictory in nature.  
Article 3(2) TEU provides the mandate for the EU to deliver citizens with an area of security, 
yet Article 4 TEU makes it clear that issues of national security remain within the Member 
                                                          
45 J. Monar, (2014). ‘EU internal security governance: the case of counter-terrorism’, European Security, 23:2, 
195-209, 195 
46 For issues of supremacy please see: V. Bogdanor, (2012). ‘Imprisoned by a doctrine: the modern defence of 
parliamentary sovereignty’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 32:1, 179-195. And: C. Eckes, (2012).  ‘Protective 
Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?’ European Law 
Journal, 18:2, 230-250. And: R. Kwiecien, (2005). ‘The Primacy of European Union Law over National Law 
Under the Constitutional Treaty.’ German Law Journal, 6:11. See: J. Monar, (2014). ‘EU internal security 
governance: the case of counter-terrorism’, European Security, 23:2, 195-209, 195 
47 J. Monar, (2014). ‘EU internal security governance: the case of counter-terrorism’, European Security, 23:2, 
195-209, 195 
48 J. Argomaniz, O. Bures, and C. Kaunert, (2014). ‘A Decade of EU Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence: A Critical 
Assessment’. Intelligence and National Security, 30:2-3, 191-206, 191 
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States ambit.  Although the latter point was acknowledged in the 2010 EU Internal Security 
Strategy,49 Article 5 TEU states; 
‘…the EU shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot 
be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional level 
and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be 
better achieved at Union level.’ 
 
This Article provides the basis for the argument proposed in this paper.  In light of the fact 
the Terrorism Situation and Trend Reports (TE-SAT) show that Member States national 
counterterrorism measures are inadequate insofar as defining a EU response, this proposal is 
not that radical.50  The EU’s internal security governance should be rather motivated by the 
threats it must counter.51  The EU has made framework decisions as early as 2002, fashioning 
minimum legislative measure implementation required by Member States, and a directive in 
2008 was passed to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism.52  Indeed, since 
the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) the major actors in providing legislation in the area of internal 
security are the European Council, European Commission and the European Parliament.  
Article 83(1) TFEU makes it clear that in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, 
the European Parliament and Council may determine a minimum set of standards regarding 
the definition of criminal offences.  Sanctions can also be set particularly when the crime is 
of a serious nature with cross-border dimensions.  The current international terror threat 
certainly satisfies this criterion and shows the prerequisite commonality to combat it.   
                                                          
49 Council of the European Union (March 2010). ‘Internal security strategy for the European Union: Towards a 
European Security Model,’, Brussels, 8 March 2010, 7120/10 
50 For 2013 TE-SAT Report see: https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2013-eu-terrorism-situation-
and-trend-report accessed 1 June 2015. For 2014 TE-SAT Report see: 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/te-sat-2014-european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-
2014 accessed 1 June 2015.  Also see: J. Monar (2014) ‘EU internal security governance: the case of counter-
terrorism’, European Security, 23:2, 195-209, 201 
51 J. Monar, (2014). ‘EU internal security governance: the case of counter-terrorism’, European Security, 23:2, 
195-209, 202 
52 Framework Decision on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA and 2008/919/JHA). And: Directive on the 
prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing 
(2005/60/EC) 
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According to the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy 2005, the responsibility of 
combating terrorism lies primarily with the Member States.  The EU proposes to add value in 
four ways: 
1. Strengthening National Capabilities 
2. Facilitating European Cooperation 
3. Developing Collective Capability 
4. Promoting International Partnership 
The third strand ensures ‘EU level capacity to understand and make collective policy 
responses to the terrorist threat…[my emphasis].’53  Under the key priorities for ‘Prevent’ the 
EU are to ‘Continue research, share analysis and experiences in order to further our 
understanding of the issues and develop policies’.54  The EU further confirms that:  
‘…while Member States have primary responsibility for improving the protection of key 
targets, the interdependency of border security, transport and other cross-border 
infrastructures require effective EU collective action…with the support of European 
institutions, [the EU] will provide an important framework in which Member States are 
able to co-ordinate their policies…’.55 
The EU can clearly act should they wish under this 2005 and the 2010 Strategy.  
Unfortunately it would appear the EU are rather reluctant to have their support of liberty and 
human rights questioned by introducing intrusive measures.  An additional sticking point for 
the EU is whether any such measure would withstand criticism from the CJEU as seen in 
joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12.  Although beyond the ambit of this paper, the CJEU 
here stuck down the Data Retention Directive, leaving the legislators now reluctant to impose 
a directive that may not comply with the principle of proportionality in light of the Charter.56  
                                                          
53 Council of the European Union (2005). The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05, 
Brussels, 30 November 2005, p4 
54 Council of the European Union (2005). The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05, 
Brussels, 30 November 2005, p9 
55 Council of the European Union (2005). The European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14469/4/05, 
Brussels, 30 November 2005, p10 
56 G. Buttarelli, (2015). ‘Counter-terrorism, De-Radicalisation and Foreign Fighters-Joint debate during the 
extraordinary meeting of the LIBE Committee’, European Parliament, Bussels 27 January 2015, 2 
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Giovanni Buttarelli, the European Data Protection Supervisor provides evidence for this in 
his address to the European Parliament:  
‘…[the test is] whether the EU legislators are able to…[pass] measures whose legality 
will be questioned’.57 
It is argued however, by introducing measures the EU will show they take liberty and security 
seriously, and protect their citizens’ rights and lives, particularly their Article 2 right.  The 
relationship between the EU executive and the courts should not dictate EU legislators in this 
way.  For some time now, counterterrorism measures have acceptably been associated with 
pushing the boundaries of the constitutionally accepted. 58   Upholding public good and 
protecting citizens right to life under Article 2 of the Charter can be used appropriately, to 
justify wide and far-reaching measures. 
The issue now of course is that due to the current terrorist threat, and EU inaction, a revision 
to the Schengen agreement made between 26 Members has been proposed by some Member 
States.  France and Spain for example have requested the EU look to implement systematic 
checks on travellers entering the passport-free Schengen area.59  Whilst this falls short of 
rewriting the agreement, any such measures would serve to impact immensely upon the 
fundament freedom of movement within the EU. 60   This could potentially also lead to 
increased feelings of segregation, felt most by Belgian citizens within certain minority 
communities within the EU.61  Such issues are well documented to go some way towards 
                                                          
57 G. Buttarelli, (2015). ‘Counter-terrorism, De-Radicalisation and Foreign Fighters-Joint debate during the 
extraordinary meeting of the LIBE Committee’, European Parliament, Bussels 27 January 2015, 2 
58 M. L. Wade, (2014). ‘The European Union as a counter-terrorism actor: right path, wrong direction?’ Crime 
Law Soc Change, 62:355-383, 374 
59 See: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/french-calls-rewrite-schengen-code-fall-deaf-
ears-312088 accessed 1 June 2015 
60 See: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/french-calls-rewrite-schengen-code-fall-deaf-
ears-312088 accessed 1 June 2015 
61 A. Tailouti, (2015). ‘School, segregation and second-generation Belgian Muslims’, ForMENA, Council for 
MENA Affairs, 27 March 2015, available at: http://formena.org/en/articles/school-segregation-and-second-
generation-belgian-muslims-746387 accessed 1 June 2015 
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self-radicalisation.62  This has resulted in the European Commission President Jean-Claude 
Juncker, confirming the Commission perceives no need to revise the Schengen rules for 
now.63   
It is argued that whilst Jean-Claude takes no action, EU citizens’ lives are unnecessarily 
being risked, in light of the fact that terrorists are free to travel unchecked within the internal 
boarders of the EU, and free to leave and return from conflict zones having received terrorist 
training.  Whilst perhaps a UK Schedule 7 type power would be a bridge to far for the EU to 
cross, systematic and coordinated checks on individuals enjoying the free movement rights 
must be implemented.64  Terrorist organisations, much like transnational crime groups, are 
taking advantage of the EU’s founding principles.  In reality ‘only random checks are made 
to see if travellers entering the Schengen area appear in a police data base because they are 
wanted by authorities or suspected of terrorist links,’ and only ’30 per cent of passports 
presented by travellers entering or leaving the Schengen area are checked electronically.’65  
Compounding the threat further is the fact Member States and the EU has finite resources in 
terms of providing adequate surveillance, both in terms of security personnel and finances.  It 
is therefore only possible to place a proportion of these individuals under some degree of 
surveillance.   
The language used with regards to passport seizures and temporary exclusion orders must not 
be misunderstood, suggesting something rather more aggressive and alienating than is 
                                                          
62 See: BBC News Report ‘State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron’, 5 February 2011 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 accessed 1 June 2015 
63 See: http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/french-calls-rewrite-schengen-code-fall-deaf-
ears-312088 accessed 1 June 2015 
64 See Terrorism Act 2000, Schedule 7 Port and Border Controls; whereby reasonable suspicion is not required 
65 EurActiv.com, (2015). ‘French calls to rewrite Schengen code fall on deaf ears’ 13 February 2015 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/french-calls-rewrite-schengen-code-fall-deaf-ears-
312088 accessed 20 May 2015 
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intended.  The idea is not to banish but to manage a citizen’s return to the EU.66  Through this 
management process, citizens who have been disillusioned by terrorist organisations and de-
radicalised, could be detected and used to assist in helping other vulnerable citizens, deterring 
them from joining such groups.  Baroness Hamwee summed up this potential during the 
debating stages for the UK’s CTSA 2015: 
‘…The most effective dissuasion of individuals from going out to fight may come from 
those who return disillusioned’.67 
 
Conclusion 
The UK’s approach to passport and travel document seizures should be used to reformulate 
the EU response.  It is far less intrusive and ensures the least amount of impact upon citizens 
given the strict time limitations.  The second element, however, requires specifically detailed 
phrasing, only allowing for such a measure if a citizen poses a serious risk should they be 
permitted to return.  Additionally, once the executive of the Member State has made an order, 
judicial review should be made available to the citizen at the earliest possible opportunity, 
financed by the State in full, ensuring the principle of proportionality, and justice.  Whilst it is 
accepted that Member Sates are perhaps best placed to enact their individual legal 
counterterrorism measures, the EU must set the standards of legislation for those Member 
States that have not yet dealt with this issue, and to raise the threshold to protect fundamental 
rights under the Charter.  The current international threat requires an international cohesive 
response.  However, the majority of Member States are yet to deal with this issue and in the 
                                                          
66 Baroness Hamwee, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords Second Reading Stage, (13 
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67 Baroness Hamwee, Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015, House of Lords Second Reading Stage, (13 
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absence of an EU measure, suspected terrorists who pose a serious risk are returning to the 
internal borders of the EU un-surveyed.  In light of the current terror threat, this paper has 
shown the aims of the EU demand consistency and uniformity in terms of anti-terrorism 
legislation. 
Given the current separatist climate seen throughout the EU and in particular the UK, the EU 
should take this opportunity to show the Member States and the international community it is 
a serious player in terms of combating terrorism, providing its citizens with safety and liberty 
by balancing State powers with fundamental rights under the Charter.68  Setting minimum 
standards of protection for its citizens by providing legislation would also show the citizens 
of the EU that it is much better to be apart of EU internal security governance.  
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